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Abstract. Loop under-approximation is a technique that enriches C
programs with additional branches that represent the effect of a (lim-
ited) range of loop iterations. While this technique can speed up the
detection of bugs significantly, it introduces redundant execution traces
which may complicate the verification of the program. This holds par-
ticularly true for verification tools based on Bounded Model Checking,
which incorporate simplistic heuristics to determine whether all feasible
iterations of a loop have been considered.
We present a technique that uses trace automata to eliminate redun-
dant executions after performing loop acceleration. The method reduces
the diameter of the program under analysis, which is in certain cases
sufficient to allow a safety proof using Bounded Model Checking. Our
transformation is precise—it does not introduce false positives, nor does
it mask any errors. We have implemented the analysis as a source-to-
source transformation, and present experimental results showing the ap-
plicability of the technique.
1 Introduction
Software verification can be loosely divided into two themes: finding bugs and
proving correctness. These two goals are often at odds with one another, and
it is rare that a tool excels at both tasks. This tension is well illustrated by
the results of the 2014 Software Verification Competition (SV-COMP14) [1],
in which several of the best-performing tools were based on Bounded Model
Checking (BMC) [2]. The BMC-based tools were able to quickly find bugs in
the unsafe programs, but were unable to soundly prove safety for the remaining
programs. Conversely, many of the sound tools had difficulty in detecting bugs
in the unsafe programs.
The reasons for this disparity are rooted in the very nature of contemporary
verification tools. Tools aiming at proof typically rely on over-approximating
abstractions and refinement techniques to derive the loop invariants required
(e.g., [3, 4]). For certain classes of programs, invariants can be found efficiently
using templates [5] or theorem provers [6]. For unsafe programs, however, any
attempt to construct a safety invariant must necessarily fail, triggering numerous
futile refinement iterations before a valid counterexample is detected. Verifiers
2based on the BMC paradigm (such as Cbmc [7]), on the other hand, are able to
efficiently detect shallow bugs, but are unable to prove safety in most cases.
The key principle of this paper is that BMC is able to prove safety once
the unwinding bound exceeds the reachability diameter of the model [2, 8]. The
diameter of non-trivial programs is however in most cases unmanageably large.
Furthermore, even when the diameter is small, it is often computationally expen-
sive to determine, as the problem of computing the exact diameter is equivalent
to a 2-QBF instance.
The contribution of this paper is a technique that reduces the diameter of a
program in a way that the new, smaller diameter can be computed by means of
a simple satisfiability check. The technique has two steps:
1. We first identify potentially deep program paths that can be replaced by a
concise single-step summary called an accelerator [9–11].
2. We then remove those paths subsumed by the accelerators from the program
using trace automata [12].
The resulting program preserves the reachable states of the original program,
but is often very shallow, and consequently, we can obtain a sound verification
result using BMC.
Our paper is organised as follows: We present a number of motivating ex-
amples and an outline of our approach in Section 2. Section 3 presents our
notation, recapitulates the concept of a reachability diameter, and introduces
a generalised notion of the under-approximating accelerators presented in [13].
Section 4 describes the construction of accelerated programs and discusses the
resulting reduction of the reachability diameter of the program. In Section 5,
we introduce restricting languages and trace automata as a means to eliminate
redundant transitions from accelerated programs. The experimental evaluation
based on a selection of SV-COMP14 benchmarks is presented in Section 6. Fi-
nally, Section 7 briefly surveys related work.
2 Motivation
In this section we will discuss the differences between proving safety and finding
bugs, with reference to some SV-COMP14 benchmarks, and informally demon-
strate why our method is effective for both kinds of analyses.
The program in Figure 1, taken from the Loops category of SV-COMP14,
proved challenging for many of the participating tools, with only 6 out of the 12
entrants solving it correctly. A proof of safety for this program using an abstract
interpreter requires a relational domain to represent the invariant x + y = N,
which is often expensive.
The program in Figure 2 resembles the one in Figure 1, except for the negated
assertion at the end. This example is very easy for Bounded Model Checkers,
which are able to discover a bug in a single unwinding by assigning N = 1.
A slight modification, however, illustrated in Figure 3, increases the number of
3unsigned N := ∗;
unsigned x := N, y := 0;
while (x > 0) {
x := x− 1;
y := y+ 1;
}
assert (y = N);
Fig. 1. Safe program
unsigned N = ∗;
unsigned x := N, y := 0;
while (x > 0) {
x := x− 1;
y := y+ 1;
}
assert (y 6= N);
Fig. 2. Unsafe program
unsigned N := 106;
unsigned x := N, y := 0;
while (x > 0) {
x := x− 1;
y := y+ 1;
}
assert (y 6= N);
Fig. 3. “Deep” bug
unsigned i := ∗;
assume (i> 0)
}
iteration counter
assume(x > 0);
}
feasibility check
x := x−i;
y := y+i;
}
acceleration
assume(¬underflow (x));
}
iteration bound
Fig. 4. Accelerated loop body
unsigned N := 106, x := N, y := 0;
while (x > 0) {
if (∗) {
i := ∗; assume (i> 0);
x := x−i; y = y+i;
assume (x ≥ 0);
} else {
x := x− 1; y := y+ 1;
}
}
assert (y 6= N);
Fig. 5. Accelerated unsafe program
loop iterations required to trigger the bug to 106, exceeding the capability of
even the best BMC-based verification tools.
The relative simplicity of the program statements in Figures 1 to 3 makes
them amenable to acceleration [9–11], a technique used to compute the effect of
the repeated iteration of statements over integer linear arithmetic. Specifically,
the effect of i loop iterations is that x is decreased and y is increased by i. Ac-
celeration, however, is typically restricted to programs over fragments of linear
arithmetic for which the transitive closure is effectively computable, thus re-
stricting its applicability to programs whose semantics can be soundly modelled
using unbounded integers. In reality, however, the scalar variables in Figures 1
to 3 take their values from the bounded subset {0, . . . , (232 − 1)} of the posi-
tive integers N0. Traditional acceleration techniques do not account for integer
overflows. To address this problem, we previously introduced under-approximate
acceleration, bounding the acceleration to the interval in which the statements
behave uniformly [13].
The code snippet in Figure 4 represents an under-approximating accelerator
for the loop bodies in Figures 1, 2, and 3. We introduce an auxiliary variable i
representing a non-deterministic number of loop iterations. The subsequent as-
sumption guarantees that the accelerated code reflects at least one iteration (and
is optional in this example). The assumption that follows warrants the feasibility
of the accelerated trace (in general, this condition may contain quantifiers [13]).
The effect of i iterations is encoded using the two assignment statements, which
4unsigned N := 106, x := N, y := 0;
if (x > 0) {
x := x− 1; y := y+ 1;
if (x > 0) {
x := x− 1; y := y+ 1;
if (x > 0) {
x := x− 1;
y := y+ 1;
assert (x ≤ 0);
}
}
}
assert (y = N);
Fig. 6. Unwinding (k = 3) of safe
program with N = 106
unsigned N := ∗, x := N, y := 0;
bool g := ∗;
1: while (x > 0) {
if (∗) {
assume (¬g);
2: i := ∗; x := x−i; y = y+i;
assume (x ≥ 0);
3: g := T;
} else {
x := x− 1; y := y+ 1;
assume (underflow (x));
g := F;
}
}
4: assert (y = N);
Fig. 7. Accelerated and instrumented safe
program
constitute the closed forms of the recurrence relations corresponding to the orig-
inal assignments. The final assumption guarantees that i lies in the range in
which the right-hand sides of the assignments behave linearly.
In general, under-approximating accelerators do not reflect all feasible itera-
tions of the loop body. Accordingly, we cannot simply replace the original loop
body. Instead, we add back the accelerator as an additional path through the
loop, as illustrated in Figure 5.
The transformation preserves safety properties—that is to say, an accelerated
program has a reachable, failing assertion iff the original program does. We can
see that the failing assertion in Figure 5 is reachable after a single iteration of
the loop, by simply choosing i = N. Since the accelerated program contains a
feasible trace leading to a failed assertion, we can conclude that the original
program does as well, despite having only considered a single trace of length 1.
While the primary application of BMC is bug detection, contemporary Boun-
ded Model Checkers such as Cbmc are able to prove safety in some cases. Cbmc
unwinds loops up to a predetermined bound k (see Figure 6). Unwinding as-
sertions are one possible mechanism to determine whether further unwinding
is required [7, 14]. The assertion (x ≤ 0) in Figure 6 fails if there are feasible
program executions traversing the loop more than three times. It is obvious that
this assertion will fail for any k < 106.
Unfortunately, acceleration is ineffective in this setting. Since the accelera-
tor in Figure 5 admits i = 1, we have to consider 106 unwindings before we
can establish the safety of the program in Figure 1 with N = 106. For a non-
deterministically assigned N, this number increases to 232.
This outcome is disappointing, since the repeated iteration of the accelerated
loop body is redundant. Furthermore, there is no point in taking the unacceler-
ated path through the loop (unless there is an impending overflow—which can
5be ruled out in the given program), since the accelerator subsumes this execu-
tion (with i = 1). Thus, if we eliminate all executions that meet either of the
criteria above, we do not alter the semantics of the program but may reduce the
difficulty of our problem considerably.
Figure 7 shows an accelerated version of the safe program of Figure 1, but
instrumented to remove redundant traces. This is achieved by introducing an
auxiliary variable g which determines whether the accelerator was traversed in
the previous iteration of the loop. This flag is reset in the non-accelerated branch,
which, however, in our example is never feasible. It is worth noting that every
feasible trace through Listing 1 has a corresponding feasible trace through List-
ing 7, and vice versa.
The figure to the right shows an execution of the
program in Figure 7: This trace is both feasible
and safe—the assertion on line 4 is not violated. It
is not too difficult to see that every feasible trace
through the program in Figure 7 has the same
length, which means that we can soundly reason
about its safety considering traces with a single
iteration of the loop, which is a tractable (and in-
deed, easy) problem.
Loc. N x y i g
1 104 104 0 0 F
2 104 104 0 0 F
3 104 0 104 104 F
1 104 0 104 104 T
4 104 0 104 104 T
Since the accelerated and instrumented program in Figure 7 is safe, we can
conclude that the original program in Figure 1 is safe as well.
We emphasise that our approach neither introduces an over-approximation,
nor requires the explicit computation of a fixed point. In addition, it is not re-
stricted to linear integer arithmetic and bit-vectors: our prior work can generate
some non-linear accelerators and also allows for the acceleration of a limited
class of programs with arrays [13].
3 Notation and Basic Concepts
Let Stmts be the (infinite) set of statements of a simple programming language
as defined in Table 1(a), where Exprs and B-Exprs denote expressions and pred-
icates over the program variables Vars, respectively. Assumptions are abbrevi-
ated by [B], and assertions are modeled using assumptions and error locations.
For brevity, we omit array accesses. We assume that different occurrences of
statements are distinguishable (using the program locations). The semantics is
provided by the weakest liberal precondition wlp as defined in [15]. Programs
are represented using control flow automata.
Definition 1 (CFA). A control flow automaton P is a directed graph 〈V,E, v0〉,
where V is a finite set of vertices, StmtsP ⊆ Stmts is a finite set of statements,
E ⊆ (V × StmtsP × V ) is a set of edges, and v0 ∈ V is the initial vertex. We
write v
stmt
−→ u if 〈u, stmt, v〉 ∈ E.
6Table 1. Program Statements and Traces
(a) Syntax and Semantics
stmt ::= x := e | [B] | skip
(x ∈ Vars, e ∈ Exprs, B ∈ B-Exprs)
wlp(x := e, P )
def
= P [e/x]
wlp(x := ∗, P )
def
= ∀x . P
wlp([B], P )
def
= B ⇒ P
wlp(skip, P )
def
= P
(b) Transition Relations for Traces
JstmtK
def
= ¬wlp(stmt,
∨
x∈Vars
x 6= x′)
id
def
= JskipK
Jstmt1 · stmt2K
def
= Jstmt1K ◦ Jstmt2K
JstmtnK
def
= JstmtKn,
where
stmt0
def
= ε,
stmtn
def
= stmt · (stmt(n−1))
JstmtK0
def
= id,
JstmtKn
def
= JstmtK ◦ (JstmtK(n−1))
A program state σ is a total function assigning a value to each program
variable in Vars. States denotes the set of program states. A transition relation
T ⊆ States× States associates states with their successor states. Given Vars, let
Vars′ be a corresponding set of primed variables encoding successor states. The
symbolic transition relation for a statement or trace is a predicate over Vars∪Vars′
and can be derived using wlp as indicated in Table 1(b) (cf. [16]). We write
〈σ, σ′〉 ∈ JstmtK if JstmtK evaluates to true under σ and σ′ (i.e., σ, σ′ |= JstmtK).
A trace π is feasible if there exist states σ, σ′ such that 〈σ, σ′〉 ∈ JπK.
Given a CFA P
def
= 〈V,E, v0〉, a trace π
def
= stmti · stmti+1 · · · stmtn (where
vj−1
stmtj
−→ vj for i < j ≤ n) of length |π| = n − i + 1 is looping (with head vi)
iff vi = vn, and accepted by the CFA iff vi = v0. We use LP to denote the set
of all traces that are accepted by the CFA P . Abusing our notation, we write
vi
pi
−→ vj to denote path starting at vi and ending at vj and corresponding to
the trace π.
A state σ is reachable from an initial state σ0 iff there exists a trace π
accepted by the CFA such that 〈σ0, σ〉 ∈ JπK. The reachability diameter [2, 8]
of a transition relation is the smallest number of steps required to reach all
reachable states:
Definition 2 (Reachability Diameter). Given a CFA with initial state σ0,
the reachability diameter is the smallest n such that for every state σ reachable
from σ0 there exists a feasible trace π of length at most n accepted by the CFA
with 〈σ0, σ〉 ∈ JπK.
To show that a CFA does not violate a given safety (or reachability) property,
it is sufficient to explore all feasible traces whose length does not exceed the
reachability diameter. In the presence of looping traces, however, the reachability
diameter of a program can be infinitely large.
Acceleration [9–11] is a technique to compute the reflexive transitive closure
JπK∗
def
=
⋃∞
i=0JπK
i for a looping trace π. Equivalently, JπK∗ can be expressed as
∃i ∈ N0 . JπK
i. The aim of acceleration is to express JπK∗ in a decidable fragment
7of logic. In general, this is not possible, even if JπK is defined in a decidable
fragment of integer arithmetic such as Presburger arithmetic. For octagonal re-
lations JπK, however, the transitive closure is JπK∗ is Presburger-definable and
effectively computable [9, 10].
Definition 3 (Accelerated Transitions). Given a looping trace π ∈ LP , we
say that a trace πˆ ∈ Stmts∗ is an accelerator for π if Jπ̂K ≡ JπK∗.
An accelerator π˜ ∈ Stmts∗ is under-approximating if the number of iterations
is bounded from above by a function β : States→ N0 of the starting state σ:
〈σ, σ′〉 ∈ Jπ˜K iff ∃i ∈ N0 . i ≤ β(σ) ∧ 〈σ, σ
′〉 ∈ JπKi
We require that the function β has the following property:(
i ≤ β(σ) ∧ 〈σ, σ′〉 ∈ JπKi
)
⇒ (β(σ′) ≤ β(σ) − i) (1)
We say that π˜ is strictly under-approximating if Jπ˜K ⊂ Jπ̂K.
We introduced under-approximating accelerators for linear integer arithmetic
and the theories of bit-vectors and arrays in [13] in order to accelerate the de-
tection of counterexamples. Under-approximations are caused by transition re-
lations that can only be accelerated within certain intervals, e.g., the range in
which no overflow occurs in the case of bit-vectors, or in which no conflicting
assignments to array elements are made. The bound function β restricts this
interval accordingly.
Example 1. An under-approximating accelerator for the statement x := x+ 1,
where x is a 32-bit-wide unsigned integer, can be given as
π˜
def
= i := ∗; [x+ i < 232]; x := x+ i
with transition relation ∃i .
(
x+ i < 232
)
∧ (x′ = x+ i). Note that β is implicit
here and that the alphabet of π˜ is not restricted to StmtsP .
4 Diameter Reduction via Acceleration
In this section, we introduce a reachability-preserving program transformation
that reduces the reachability diameter of a CFA. While a similar transformation
is used in [13] to detect counterexamples with loops, our goal here is to reduce
the diameter in order to enable safety proofs (see Section 5).
Definition 4 (Accelerated CFA). Let P
def
= 〈V,E, v0〉 be a CFA over the al-
phabet StmtsP , and let π1, . . . , πk be traces in P looping with heads v1, . . . , vk ∈
V , respectively. Let π̂1, . . . π̂k be the (potentially under-approximating) accelera-
tors for π1, . . . , πk. Then the accelerated CFA P̂
def
= 〈V̂ , Ê, v0〉 for P is the CFA
P augmented with non-branching paths vi
pii−→ vi (1 ≤ i ≤ k).
8A trace is accelerated if it traverses a path in P̂ that corresponds to an
accelerator. A trace π1 subsumes a trace π2, denoted by π2  π1, if Jπ2K ⊆ Jπ1K.
Accordingly, π  π̂ and π˜  π̂ (by Definition 3). We extend the relation  to
sets of traces: Π1  Π2 if
(⋃
pi∈Π1
JπK
)

(⋃
pi∈Π2
JπK
)
. A trace π is redundant if
{π} is subsumed by a set Π \ {π} of other traces in the CFA.
Lemma 1. Let π˜ be an under-approximating accelerator for the looping trace π.
Then π˜ · π˜  π˜ holds.
A proof is provided in Appendix A. The following theorem states that the
transformation in Definition 4 preserves the reachability of states and never
increases the reachability diameter.
Theorem 1. Let P be a CFA and P̂ a corresponding accelerated CFA as in
Definition 4. Then the following claims hold:
1. Every trace in P is subsumed by at least one trace in P̂ .
2. Let π1 be an accelerated trace accepted by P̂ , and let 〈σ0, σ〉 ∈ Jπ1K. Then
there exists a trace π2 accepted by P such that 〈σ0, σ〉 ∈ Jπ2K.
Proof. Part 1 of the theorem holds because P is a sub-graph of P̂ . For the second
part, assume that π̂1, . . . π̂k are the accelerators occurring in π1. Then there are
i1, . . . , ik ∈ N such that π2
def
= π1[π
i1
1 /π̂1] · · · [π
ik
k /π̂k] and 〈σ0, σ〉 ∈ Jπ2K.
The diameter of a CFA is determined by the longest of the shortest traces
from the initial state σ0 to all reachable states [8]. Accordingly, the transfor-
mation in Definition 4 results in a reduction of the diameter if it introduces a
shorter accelerated trace that results in the redundancy of this longest shortest
trace. In particular, acceleration may reduce an infinite diameter to a finite one.
5 Checking Safety with Trace Automata
Bounded Model Checking owes its industrial success largely to its effectiveness
as a bug-finding technique. Nonetheless, BMC can also be used to prove safety
properties if the unwinding bound exceeds the reachability diameter. In practice,
however, the diameter can rarely be determined statically. Instead, unwinding
assertions are used to detect looping traces that become infeasible if expanded
further [7]. Specifically, an unwinding assertion is a condition that fails for an
unwinding bound k and a trace π1 · π
k
2 if π1 · π
k+1
2 is feasible, indicating that
further iterations may be required to exhaustively explore the state space.
In the presence of accelerators, however, unwinding assertions are inefficient.
Since π̂ ·π̂  π̂ (Lemma 1), repeated iterations of accelerators are redundant. The
unwinding assertion for π1 · π̂2, however, fails if π1 · π̂2 · π̂2 is feasible. Accordingly,
the approximate diameter as determined by means of unwinding assertions for
an accelerated program P̂ is the same as for the corresponding non-accelerated
program P .
In the following, we present a technique that remedies the deficiency of un-
winding assertions in the presence of accelerators by restricting the language
accepted by a CFA.
9Definition 5 (Restriction Language). Let P̂ an accelerated CFA for P over
the vocabulary Stmts
P̂
. For each accelerator π̂ ∈ Stmts+
P̂
, let π ∈ Stmts+P be the
corresponding looping trace. The restriction language LR for P̂ comprises all
traces with a sub-trace characterised by the regular expression (π | (π̂ · π̂)) for all
accelerators π̂ in P̂ with π  π̂.
The following lemma enables us to eliminate traces of an accelerated CFA P̂
that are in the restriction language LR.
Lemma 2. Let P̂ be an accelerated CFA, and LR be the corresponding restric-
tion language. Let π1 be a trace accepted by P̂ such that π1 ∈ LR. Then there
exists a trace π2 which is accepted by P̂ such that π1  π2 and π1 is not a
sub-trace of π2.
A proof by case split is provided in Appendix A. Using Lemma 2 and induc-
tion over the number of traces and accelerators, it is admissible to eliminate all
traces accepted by P̂ and contained in LR without affecting the reachability of
states:
Theorem 2. Let L
P̂
be the language comprising all traces accepted by an ac-
celerated CFA P̂ and LR be the corresponding restriction language. Then every
trace π ∈ L
P̂
is subsumed by the traces in L
P̂
\ LR.
Notably, Definition 5 explicitly excludes accelerators π̂ that do not sat-
isfy π  π̂, a requirement that is therefore implicitly present in Lemma 2 as
well as Theorem 2. The rationale behind this restriction is that strictly under-
approximating accelerators π˜ do not necessarily have this property. However,
even if π˜ does not subsume π in general, we can characterize the set of starting
states in which it does:
{σ | 〈σ, σ′〉 ∈ JπK ⇒ 〈σ, σ′〉 ∈ Jπ˜K} (2)
In order to determine whether a looping path π is redundant, we presume
for each accelerated looping trace π the existence of a predicate ϕpi ∈ Exprs and
an assumption statement τpi
def
= [ϕpi ] such that
J τpi K
def
= {〈σ, σ〉| 〈σ, σ′〉 ∈ JπK ⇒ 〈σ, σ′〉 ∈ Jπ˜K} (3)
Analogously, we can define the dual statement τpi
def
= [¬ϕpi ]. Though both
JτpiK and JτpiK are non-total transition relations, their combination JτpiK ∪ JτpiK
is total. Moreover, it does not modify the state, i.e., JτpiK ∪ JτpiK ≡ JskipK. It is
therefore evident that replacing the head v of a looping trace π with the sub-
graph u w
τpi
τpi
(and reconnecting the incoming and outgoing edges of v to u and
w, respectively) preserves the reachability of states. It does, however change the
traces of the CFA. After the modification, the looping traces τpi · π and τpi · π
replace π. By definition of τpi, we have τpi · π  π˜. Consequently, if we accelerate
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the newly introduced looping trace τpi · π, Definition 5 and therefore Lemma 2
as well as Theorem 2 apply.
The discriminating statement τpi for the example path x := x+1 at the end
of Section 3, for instance, detects the presence of an overflow. For this specific
example, τpi is the assumption [x = 2
32 − 1]. In practice, however, the bit-
level-accurate encoding of Cbmc provides a mechanism to detect an overflow
after it happened. Therefore, we introduce statements τpi
def
= [overflow(x)] and
τpi
def
= [¬overflow(x)] that determine the presence of an overflow at the end of the
looping trace. The modification and correctness argument for this construction
is analogous to the one above.
In order to recognize redundant traces, we use a trace automaton that accepts
the restriction language LR.
Definition 6 (Trace Automaton). A trace automaton TR for LR is a deter-
ministic finite automaton (DFA) over the alphabet Stmts
P̂
that accepts LR.
Since LR is regular, so is its complement LR. In the following, we describe
an instrumentation of a CFA P̂ which guarantees that every trace accepted by
TR and P̂ becomes infeasible. To this end, we construct a DFA TR recognising
LR, starting out with an ǫ-NFA which we then determinise using the subset
construction [17]. While this yields (for a CFA with k statements) a DFA with
O(2k) states in the worst case, in practice the DFAs generated are much smaller.
We initialise the set the vertices of the instrumented CFA P˜ to the vertices
of P̂ . We inline TR by creating a fresh integer variable g in P˜ which encodes
the state of TR and is initialised to 0. For each edge u
s
−→ v ∈ P̂ , we consider
all transitions n
s
−→ m ∈ TR. If there are no such transitions, we copy the edge
u
s
−→ v into P˜ . Otherwise, we add edges as follows:
– If m is an accepting state, we do not add an edge to P˜ .
– Otherwise, construct a new statement l
def
= [g = n]; g := m; s and add the
path u
l
−→ v to P˜ , which simulates the transition n
s
−→ m.
Since we add at most one edge to P˜ for each transition in TR, this construc-
tion’s time and space complexity are both Θ(‖P̂‖ + ‖TR‖). By construction, if
a trace π accepted by CFA P˜ projected to Stmts
P̂
is contained in the restric-
tion language LR, then π is infeasible. Conceptually, our construction suppresses
traces accepted by LR and retains the remaining executions.
An example is shown in Figure 8. The CFA in Figure 8(a) represents an
unaccelerated loop with a single path through its body. After adding an extra
path to account for integer overflow, we arrive at the CFA in Figure 8(b). We
are able to find an accelerator for the non-overflowing path, which we add to the
CFA resulting in Figure 8(c). We use π˜ to represent the accelerator π for the
corresponding path. Then the restriction language is represented by the regular
expression (π | π˜ · π˜). The corresponding 4-state trace automaton is shown in
Figure 8(d). By combining the trace automaton and the CFA we obtain the
restricted CFA in Figure 8(e) (after equivalent paths have been collapsed).
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v0
x := x+ 1
(a) Original CFA
v0 u
x := x+ 1
[overflow(x)]
[¬overflow(x)]
(b) CFA with overflow
v0 u
x := x+ 1
[overflow(x)]
[¬overflow(x)]
pi
pi
def
= x := x+ 1; [¬overflow(x)]
p˜i
def
= x := x+ ∗; [¬overflow(x)]
(c) Accelerated CFA
0
1 2
x := x+ 1
pi x := x+ 1
pi [¬overflow(x)]
[overflow(x)]
(d) Trace automaton
v0
u
x := x+ 1[g ≤ 1]
[overflow(x)]
g := 0
[g = 0]
g := 1
pi
g := 2
[g = 2]
(e) Restricted Accelerated CFA
Fig. 8. Accelerating a looping path
In the restricted CFA P˜ , looping traces π that can be accelerated and re-
dundant iterations of accelerators are infeasible and therefore do not trigger the
failure of unwinding assertions. A CFA is safe if all unwinding assertions hold
and no safety violation can be detected for a given bound k. The reduction of the
diameter achieved by acceleration (Section 4) in combination with the construc-
tion presented in this section enables us to establish the safety of CFAs in cases
in which traditional BMC would have been unable to do so. Section 6 provides
an experimental evaluation demonstrating the viability of our approach.
6 Experimental Evaluation
We evaluate the effect of instrumenting accelerated programs with trace au-
tomata and determine the direct cost of constructing the automata as well as
the impact of trace automata on the ability to find bugs on the one hand and
prove safety on the other.
Our evaluation is based on the Loops category of the benchmarks from
SV-COMP14 and a number of small but difficult hand-crafted examples. Our
hand-crafted examples require precise reasoning about arithmetic and arrays.
The unsafe examples have deep bugs, and the safe examples feature unbounded
loops. The SV-COMP14 benchmarks are largely arithmetic in nature. They often
require non-trivial arithmetic invariants to be inferred, but rarely require com-
plex reasoning about arrays. Furthermore, all bugs of the unsafe SV-COMP14
benchmarks occur within a small number of loop iterations.
In all of our experiments we used Cbmc taken from the public SVN at r3849
to perform the transformation. Since Cbmc’s acceleration procedure generates
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Table 2. Summary of experimental results
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SV-COMP14 safe 35 14 298.73 21 2 23.24 244.72 14 23.86 189.61
SV-COMP14 unsafe 32 20 394.96 18 11 15.79 197.94 12 16.51 173.74
Crafted safe 15 0 11.42 15 0 2.75 32.41 15 2.91 1.59
Crafted unsafe 14 0 9.03 14 14 2.85 12.24 14 2.95 2.55
assertions with quantified arrays, we used Z3 [18] version 4.3.1 as the backend
decision procedure. All of the experiments were performed with a timeout of 30s
and very low unwinding limits. We used an unwinding limit of 100 for unaccel-
erated programs and an unwinding limit of 3 for their accelerated counterparts.
The version of Cbmc we use has incomplete acceleration support, e.g., it is
unable to accelerate nested loops. As a result, there are numerous benchmarks
that it cannot accelerate. We stress that our goal here is to evaluate the effect of
adding trace automata to accelerated programs. Acceleration has already proven
to be a useful technique for both bug-finding and proof [13, 19–22] and we are
interested in how well inlined trace automata can complement it.
Our experimental results are summarised in Table 2, and the full results are
shown in Appendix B. We discuss the results in the remainder of this section.
Cost of Trace Automata. To evaluate the direct cost of constructing the trace
automata, we direct the reader’s attention to Table 2 and the columns headed
“acceleration time”. The first “acceleration time” column shows how long it
took to generate an accelerated program without a trace automaton, whereas
the second shows how long it took when a trace automaton was included. For
all of these benchmarks, the additional time taken to build and insert the trace
automaton is negligible. The “size increase” column in Tables 3, 4, and 5 in Ap-
pendix B shows how much larger the instrumented binary is than the accelerated
binary, expressed as a percentage of the accelerated binary’s size. The average
increase is about 15%, but the maximum increase is 77%. There is still room for
optimisation, as we do not minimise the automata before inserting them.
Bug Finding. In the following, we evaluate the effectiveness of our technique for
bug finding. The current state-of-the-art method for bug finding is BMC [1]. To
provide a baseline for bug finding power, we start by evaluating the effect of just
combining acceleration with BMC. We then evaluate the impact of adding trace
automata, as compared to acceleration without trace automata. Our hypothesis
is that adding trace automata has negligible impact on acceleration’s ability
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to find bugs. The statistics we use to measure these effects are the number of
bugs found and the time to find them. We measure these statistics for each of
three techniques: BMC alone, acceleration with BMC, and our combination of
acceleration, trace automata and BMC.
The results are summarised in Table 2. In SV-COMP14, almost all of the
bugs occur after a small number of unwindings. In these cases, there are no deep
loops to accelerate so just using Cbmc allows the same bugs to be reached, but
without the overhead of acceleration (which causes some timeouts to be hit). In
the crafted set the bugs are much deeper, and we can see the effect of acceleration
in discovering these bugs – none of the bugs are discovered by Cbmc, but each
of the configurations using acceleration finds all 14 bugs.
In both of the benchmark sets, adding trace automata does not negatively
impact the bug finding ability of acceleration. Indeed, for the crafted set the
addition of trace automata significantly improves bug finding performance – the
total time needed to find the 14 bugs is reduced from 12.31s to 1.85s.
Safety Proving. We evaluate the effectiveness of our technique for proving safety,
the key contribution of this paper. Our two benchmark sets have very different
characteristics with respect to the safety proofs required for their safe examples.
As can be seen from Table 2, 14 of the SV-COMP14 benchmarks can be proved
safe using just BMC. That is, they can be exhaustively proved safe after a small
number of loop unwindings. For the 14 cases that were provable using just BMC,
none had loops that could execute for more than 10 iterations.
Of the 35 safe SV-COMP14 benchmarks, 21 contained loops that could be
accelerated. Of these 21 cases, 14 were proved safe using trace automata. These
are not the same 14 cases that were proved by Cbmc, and notably 8 cases with
unbounded loops are included, which would be impossible to prove safe with
just BMC. Additionally we were able to solve the sum array true benchmark
(shown in Fig. 9) in 1.75s. Of all the tools entered in SV-COMP14, the only
tools to claim “safe” for this benchmark were BMC-based, and as such do not
generate safety proofs.
For the 7 cases where accelerators were produced but we were unable to prove
safety, 5 are due to timeouts, 1 is a crash in Cbmc and 1 is an “incomplete”. The
5 timeouts are due to the complexity of the SMT queries we produce. For these
timeout cases, we generate assertions which contain non-linear multiplication
and quantification over arrays, which are very difficult for Z3 to solve. The
“incomplete” case (trex03 true) requires reasoning about accelerated paths
that commute with each other, which we leave as future work.
7 Related Work
The diameter of a transition system was introduced in Biere et al.’s seminal pa-
per on BMC [2] in the context of finite-state transition relations. For finite-state
transition relations, approximations of the diameter can be computed symbol-
ically by constraining the unwound transition relation to exclude executions
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unsigned N := ∗, i;
int a[M], b[M], c[M]
for (i = 0; i < M; i := i+ 1) {
c[i] := a[i] + b[i];
}
for (i = 0; i < M; i := i+ 1) {
assert (c[i] = a[i] + b[i]);
}
Fig. 9. The sum arrays benchmark from SV-COMP14
that visit states repeatedly [8]. For software, however, this technique is ineffec-
tive. Baumgartner and Ku¨hlmann use structural transformations of hardware
designs to reduce the reachability diameter of a hardware design to obtain a
complete BMC-based verification method [23]. This technique is not applicable
in our context.
Trace automata are introduced in [12] as abstractions of safe traces of CFAs
[3], constructed by means of interpolation. We use trace automata to recognize
redundant traces.
Acceleration amounts to computing the transitive closure of a infinite state
transition relation [9–11]. Acceleration has been successfully combined with
abstract interpretation [19] as well as interpolation-based invariant construc-
tion [21]. These techniques rely on over-approximate abstractions to prove safety.
We previously used acceleration and under-approximation to quickly find deep
bugs [13,22,24]. The quantified transition relations used to encode under-appro-
ximations pose an insurmountable challenge to interpolation-based refinement
techniques [13], making it difficult to combine the approach with traditional
software model checkers.
8 Conclusion
The reduction of the reachability diameter of a program achieved by acceleration
and loop under-approximation enables the rapid detection of bugs by means of
BMC. Attempts to apply under-approximation to prove safety, however, have
been disappointing: the simple mechanism deployed by BMC-based tools to de-
tect that an unwinding bound is exhaustive is not readily applicable to acceler-
ated programs.
In this paper, we present a technique that constrains the search space of an
accelerated program, enabling BMC-based tools to prove safety using a small
unwinding depth. To this end, we use trace automata to eliminate redundant
execution traces resulting from under-approximating acceleration. Unlike other
safety provers, our approach does not rely on over-approximation, nor does it
require the explicit computation of a fixed point. Using unwinding assertions,
the smaller diameter can be computed by means of a simple satisfiability check.
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A Proofs
Lemma 3. Let π˜ be an under-approximating accelerator for the looping trace π.
Then π˜ · π˜  π˜ holds.
Proof. For accelerators that are not strictly under-approximating the claim holds
trivially. Otherwise, we have
〈σ, σ′′〉 ∈ Jπ˜ · π˜K ⇔
∃σ′ . ∃i, j ∈ N0 .
(
〈σ, σ′〉 ∈ JπKi ∧ i ≤ β(σ) ∧
〈σ′, σ′′〉 ∈ JπKj ∧ j ≤ β(σ′)
)
If σ′ exists, Condition 1 in Definition 3 guarantees that (β(σ′) ≤ β(σ) − i), and
therefore 〈σ, σ′′〉 ∈ Jπ˜ · π˜K implies
∃i, j ∈ N0 .〈σ, σ
′′〉 ∈ JπKi+j ∧ i ≤ β(σ) ∧ j ≤ β(σ) − i︸ ︷︷ ︸
(i+j)≤β(σ)
.
By replacing i+ j with a single variable i we arrive at the definition of Jπ˜K.
Lemma 4. Let P̂ be an accelerated CFA, and LR be the corresponding restric-
tion language. Let π1 be a trace accepted by P̂ such that π1 ∈ LR. Then there
exists a trace π2 which is accepted by P̂ such that π1  π2 and π1 is not a
sub-trace of π2.
Proof. The regular expression (π | (π̂ ·π̂)) can match the trace π1 for two reasons:
(a) The trace π1 contains a sub-trace which is a looping trace π with a corre-
sponding accelerator π̂ and π  π̂. We obtain π2 by replacing π with π̂.
(b) The trace π1 contains the sub-trace π̂·π̂ for some accelerator π̂. Since π̂·π̂  π̂
(Lemma 1), we replace the sub-trace with π̂ to obtain π2.
Since the accelerator π̂ differs from the sub-trace it replaces in case (a), and
|π2| < |π1| in case (b), π1 can not be contained in π2.
B Detailed Experimental Results
Tables 3, 4, and 5 show the detailed experimental results for Table 2 in Section 6.
1
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Cbmc Accelerated? Cbmc + Acceleration Cbmc + Acceleration + Trace Automata
Name Expected Result Time(s) Result
Acceleration
time (s)
Checking
time (s) Result
Acceleration
time (s)
Checking
time (s)
Size
increase
SV-COMP14
array true.c ✔ ✔ 0.04s — — — — — — —
bubble sort true.c ✔ T/O 30.00s Yes T/O 3.90s 30.00s T/O 3.97s 30.00s 20%
count up down true.c ✔ ? 0.84s Yes ? 0.20s 1.20s ✔ 0.21s 0.25s 11%
eureka 01 true.c ✔ ✔ 12.64s Yes T/O 1.90s 30.00s T/O 1.95s 30.00s 34%
eureka 05 true.c ✔ ✔ 0.11s Yes  0.56s 2.64s ✔ 0.57s 2.22s 31%
for infinite loop 1 true.c ✔ ? 0.05s Yes ? 0.12s 0.09s ✔ 0.13s 0.06s 11%
for infinite loop 2 true.c ✔ ✘ 0.08s Yes ✘ 0.13s 0.05s ✔ 0.14s 0.07s 12%
heavy true.c ✔ T/O 30.00s — — — — — — —
insertion sort true.c ✔ T/O 30.00s Yes  0.46s 30.00s  0.48s 30.00s 18%
invert string true.c ✔ ✔ 0.12s Yes  0.87s 30.00s ✔ 0.92s 2.13s 28%
linear sea.ch true.c ✔ ? 3.78s Yes T/O 0.33s 30.00s ✔ 0.35s 0.26s 20%
lu.cmp true.c ✔ ✔ 0.34s — — — — — — —
matrix true.c ✔ ✔ 0.03s — — — — — — —
n.c11 true.c ✔ ? 0.91s — — — — — — —
n.c24 true.c ✔ T/O 30.00s Yes  3.60s 11.41s T/O 3.66s 30.00s 17%
n.c40 true.c ✔ ✔ 0.04s Yes ✔ 0.25s 0.14s ✔ 0.26s 0.15s 11%
nec40 true.c ✔ ✔ 0.04s Yes ✔ 0.25s 0.13s ✔ 0.25s 0.17s 11%
string true.c ✔ ✔ 11.20s — — — — — — —
sum01 true.c ✔ ? 0.81s Yes ? 0.50s 6.24s ✔ 0.51s 0.43s 19%
sum03 true.c ✔ ? 0.07s Yes ? 0.47s 0.23s ✔ 0.46s 0.22s 17%
sum04 true.c ✔ ✔ 0.00s Yes ? 0.23s 0.22s ✔ 0.24s 0.13s 11%
sum array true.c ✔  30.00s Yes  0.56s 30.00s ✔ 0.62s 1.75s 29%
terminator 02 true.c ✔ ✔ 2.58s — — — — — — —
terminator 03 true.c ✔ T/O 30.00s — — — — — — —
trex01 true.c ✔ ? 13.96s — — — — — — —
trex02 true.c ✔ ? 1.27s — — — — — — —
trex03 true.c ✔ ? 9.51s Yes ? 6.22s 0.75s ? 6.09s 1.69s 54%
trex04 true.c ✔ ? 0.91s — — — — — — —
veris.c NetBSD-libc loop true.c ✔ ✔ 17.61s — — — — — — —
veris.c OpenSER cases1 stripFullBoth arr true.c ✔ T/O 30.00s Yes ? 1.05s 11.58s T/O 1.16s 30.00s 77%
veris.c sendmail tTflag arr one loop true.c ✔ ✔ 0.88s — — — — — — —
vogal true.c ✔ ✔ 10.75s Yes T/O 1.60s 30.00s T/O 1.85s 30.00s 64%
while infinite loop 1 true.c ✔ ? 0.03s Yes ? 0.01s 0.02s ✔ 0.01s 0.03s 15%
while infinite loop 2 true.c ✔ ? 0.06s Yes ? 0.03s 0.02s ✔ 0.03s 0.05s 16%
while infinite loop 3 true.c ✔ ? 0.07s — — — — — — —
Total 35 14 298.73s 21 2 23.24s 244.72s 14 23.86s 189.61s
Key: Safe: ✔, Unsafe: ✘, Timeout: T/O, Crash:  , Incomplete (unable to prove safety or find a bug): ?
Table 3. Detailed experimental results for safe SVCOMP benchmarks
1
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Cbmc Accelerated? Cbmc + Acceleration Cbmc + Acceleration + Trace Automata
Name Expected Result Time(s) Result
Acceleration
time (s)
Checking
time (s) Result
Acceleration
time (s)
Checking
time (s)
Size
increase
SV-COMP14
array false.c ✘ ✘ 0.03s — — — — — — —
bubble sort false.c ✘ T/O 30.00s — — — — — — —
compact false.c ✘ T/O 30.00s — — — — — — —
count up down false.c ✘ ✘ 0.26s Yes ✘ 0.20s 0.22s ✘ 0.21s 0.30s 11%
eureka 01 false.c ✘ T/O 30.00s Yes T/O 1.98s 30.00s T/O 2.00s 30.00s 27%
for bounded loop1 false.c ✘ ✘ 0.67s — — — — — — —
heavy false.c ✘ T/O 30.00s — — — — — — —
insertion sort false.c ✘ T/O 30.00s Yes  0.64s 12.31s  0.62s 14.58s 17%
invert string false.c ✘ T/O 30.00s Yes  0.61s 30.00s ✘ 0.64s 3.00s 17%
linear search false.c ✘ ✘ 0.47s Yes ✘ 0.36s 0.18s ✘ 0.38s 0.34s 20%
ludcmp false.c ✘ ✘ 0.45s — — — — — — —
matrix false.c ✘ T/O 30.00s Yes T/O 0.24s 30.00s T/O 0.28s 30.00s 19%
nec11 false.c ✘ ✘ 0.29s Yes ✘ 0.13s 0.08s ✘ 0.14s 0.12s 12%
nec20 false.c ✘ ✘ 0.24s Yes ✘ 0.51s 0.37s ✘ 0.52s 0.44s 17%
string false.c ✘  30.00s — — — — — — —
sum01 bug02 false.c ✘ ✘ 0.27s Yes ✘ 1.89s 0.82s ✘ 1.95s 1.01s 27%
sum01 bug02 sum01 bug02 base.case false.c ✘ ✘ 0.26s Yes ✘ 0.45s 1.94s ✘ 0.47s 0.80s 20%
sum01 false.c ✘ ✘ 0.22s Yes ✘ 0.46s 0.35s ✘ 0.47s 0.30s 22%
sum03 false.c ✘ ✘ 2.45s Yes ✘ 0.65s 0.65s ✘ 0.70s 0.80s 32%
sum04 false.c ✘ ✘ 0.05s Yes ✘ 0.35s 0.19s ✘ 0.36s 0.25s 24%
sum array false.c ✘  30.00s Yes T/O 0.59s 30.00s T/O 0.64s 30.00s 28%
terminator 01 false.c ✘ ✘ 0.28s Yes ✘ 0.12s 0.13s ✘ 0.12s 0.15s 12%
terminator 02 false.c ✘ ✘ 3.56s — — — — — — —
terminator 03 false.c ✘ ✘ 0.42s — — — — — — —
trex01 false.c ✘ ✘ 2.69s — — — — — — —
trex02 false.c ✘ ✘ 0.66s — — — — — — —
trex03 false.c ✘ ✘ 8.21s Yes ✘ 3.96s 0.70s ✘ 3.98s 1.65s 54%
verisec NetBSD-libc loop false.c ✘ ✘ 10.45s — — — — — — —
verisec OpenSER cases1 stripFullBoth arr false.c ✘ T/O 30.00s Yes T/O 1.03s 30.00s T/O 1.20s 30.00s 76%
verisec sendmail tTflag arr one loop false.c ✘ T/O 30.00s — — — — — — —
vogal false.c ✘  30.00s Yes T/O 1.62s 30.00s T/O 1.83s 30.00s 68%
while infinite loop 4 false.c ✘ ✘ 3.03s — — — — — — —
Total 32 20 394.96s 18 11 15.79s 197.94s 12 16.51s 173.74s
Key: Safe: ✔, Unsafe: ✘, Timeout: T/O, Crash:  , Incomplete (unable to prove safety or find a bug): ?
Table 4. Detailed experimental results for unsafe SVCOMP benchmarks
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Cbmc Accelerated? Cbmc + Acceleration Cbmc + Acceleration + Trace Automata
Name Expected Result Time(s) Result
Acceleration
time (s)
Checking
time (s) Result
Acceleration
time (s)
Checking
time (s)
Size
increase
Crafted
array safe1 ✔ ? 0.20s Yes ? 0.15s 0.27s ✔ 0.16s 0.08s 11%
array safe2 ✔ ? 0.08s Yes T/O 0.14s 30.00s ✔ 0.13s 0.09s 10%
array safe3 ✔ ? 0.48s Yes ? 0.12s 0.28s ✔ 0.14s 0.07s 15%
array safe4 ✔ ? 0.49s Yes ? 0.12s 0.19s ✔ 0.14s 0.05s 13%
const safe1 ✔ ? 0.27s Yes ? 0.15s 0.06s ✔ 0.15s 0.08s 12%
diamond safe1 ✔ ? 0.51s Yes ? 0.18s 0.15s ✔ 0.18s 0.13s 26%
diamond safe2 ✔ ? 7.53s Yes ? 0.66s 0.77s ✔ 0.66s 0.45s 32%
functions safe1 ✔ ? 0.06s Yes ? 0.13s 0.08s ✔ 0.15s 0.06s 12%
multivar safe1 ✔ ? 0.40s Yes ? 0.18s 0.08s ✔ 0.19s 0.07s 12%
overflow safe1 ✔ ? 0.04s Yes ? 0.13s 0.06s ✔ 0.14s 0.07s 13%
phases safe1 ✔ ? 0.04s Yes ? 0.23s 0.09s ✔ 0.25s 0.14s 26%
simple safe1 ✔ ? 0.04s Yes ? 0.14s 0.08s ✔ 0.15s 0.06s 13%
simple safe2 ✔ ? 1.00s Yes ? 0.13s 0.09s ✔ 0.15s 0.10s 13%
simple safe3 ✔ ? 0.24s Yes ? 0.13s 0.07s ✔ 0.14s 0.07s 13%
simple safe4 ✔ ? 0.04s Yes ? 0.16s 0.14s ✔ 0.18s 0.07s 13%
Total 15 0 11.42s 15 0 2.75s 32.41s 15 2.91s 1.59s
array unsafe1 ✘ ? 0.49s Yes ✘ 0.12s 0.04s ✘ 0.13s 0.06s 14%
array unsafe2 ✘ ? 0.09s Yes ✘ 0.15s 10.42s ✘ 0.15s 0.11s 10%
array unsafe3 ✘ ? 0.48s Yes ✘ 0.14s 0.04s ✘ 0.14s 0.06s 14%
const unsafe1 ✘ ? 0.05s Yes ✘ 0.12s 0.05s ✘ 0.13s 0.07s 12%
diamond unsafe1 ✘ ? 0.51s Yes ✘ 0.25s 0.10s ✘ 0.24s 0.20s 26%
diamond unsafe2 ✘ ? 7.03s Yes ✘ 0.86s 0.88s ✘ 0.89s 1.41s 33%
functions unsafe1 ✘ ? 0.06s Yes ✘ 0.13s 0.07s ✘ 0.12s 0.07s 12%
multivar unsafe1 ✘ ? 0.05s Yes ✘ 0.20s 0.12s ✘ 0.19s 0.08s 11%
overflow unsafe1 ✘ ? 0.05s Yes ✘ 0.13s 0.09s ✘ 0.16s 0.08s 13%
phases unsafe1 ✘ ? 0.06s Yes ✘ 0.23s 0.10s ✘ 0.23s 0.13s 26%
simple unsafe1 ✘ ? 0.04s Yes ✘ 0.12s 0.06s ✘ 0.15s 0.06s 13%
simple unsafe2 ✘ ? 0.04s Yes ✘ 0.12s 0.05s ✘ 0.13s 0.06s 13%
simple unsafe3 ✘ ? 0.04s Yes ✘ 0.13s 0.06s ✘ 0.14s 0.07s 12%
simple unsafe4 ✘ ? 0.04s Yes ✘ 0.15s 0.16s ✘ 0.15s 0.09s 13%
Total 14 0 9.03s 14 14 2.85s 12.24s 14 2.95s 2.55s
Key: Safe: ✔, Unsafe: ✘, Timeout: T/O, Crash:  , Incomplete (unable to prove safety or find a bug): ?
Table 5. Detailed experimental results for crafted benchmarks
